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An Interim Plan for South-East Europe 
Customs Union with the EU and a 
Regional Schengen for the Free Movement of People 
Michael Emerson* 
 
The central recommendation of the Amato report 
of April 2005
1 set the year 2014 as the target 
accession date for the whole of the Western 
Balkans, which would take the EU from the 27 
(in 2007 or 2008) to 32 member states minimally, 
33 with Turkey, and 35 in the event of 
independence for Montenegro and Kosovo. This 
scenario is in contradiction with the present 
mood of the EU following the French and the 
Dutch referenda, which rejected the Constitution 
that was itself designed to pave the way 
institutionally for further enlargement. The EU 
has now officially entered a period of profound 
reflection on its future, a process which cannot 
be hurried.  
While the Amato group had bad luck in its 
timing, a mood of pessimism in the region is not 
necessary. Recent developments in relations 
between the EU and South-East Europe have on 
the contrary been really quite promising. In 
October it was decided that accession 
negotiations could now begin with both Turkey 
and Croatia, and negotiations with Serbia-
Montenegro and with Bosnia for Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements (SAAs) are to be 
launched. This package of agreements needed a 
dose of cliff-hanging political drama to get 
adopted, but such is invariably the case for all 
important decisions taken by the EU and its 
member states. The Commission still highlights 
problems to be resolved by Bulgaria and 
Romania, but only 12 months separate the most 
positive versus negative outcomes: 1 January 
2007 or 2008.  
 
* Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. This paper was first 
presented to the 5
th Regional Finance & Investment 
Conference for South-East Europe, Dubrovnik, 25-26 
October 2005. 
1 International Commission for the Balkans, “The 
Balkans in Europe’s Future”, Giuliano Amato 
(Chairman), published by the Centre for Liberal 
Strategies, Sofia, April 2005. 
Two regional economic initiatives that have emerged in 
the course of 2004 are also notable: the signing of the 
Energy Community between the EU and the whole of 
South-East Europe, and the opening of Single European 
Sky negotiations between the EU and states of the region. 
The civil aviation agreements would encourage new 
regional airline networks, so badly needed. With ongoing 
work to upgrade the Trans-European Network of transport 
corridors through the region, three strategic economic 
networks (energy, land and air transport) will be 
progressing for the region as a whole, irrespective of who 
accedes to the EU earlier or later.  
Since the process of enlargement cannot be hurried, there 
is every reason to consolidate the positive recent 
developments with further initiatives of strategic 
importance to the region. There are two outstanding 
candidates for this purpose: 1) enlargement of the existing 
Customs Union of the EU and Turkey to include the whole 
of the Western Balkans, and 2) a South-East European 
Schengen Agreement.  
Together these could be at the heart of a new interim plan 
for the region, pending clarification of further enlargement 
prospects.  
1.  Customs Union for the EU and the whole of 
South-East Europe  
Trade policy in the region has made important progress 
since 2001, when it was agreed to negotiate a matrix of 
bilateral free trade agreements among the states of the 
South-East European Cooperative Initiative. This has 
largely been put into effect, although there are many 
product-specific exceptions to the general principle of 
tariff- and quota-free trade (see Annex A). 
It was further agreed in June 2005 to explore the 
possibility of multilateralising these bilateral agreements 
with a single agreement. This could improve the system, 
yet it would still be far from the goal of complete 
integration into the EU internal market.  
The next step should therefore be for the whole of the 
Western Balkans to join the Customs Union of the EU 
(soon to be 27 with Bulgaria and Romania) and Turkey, 
thus embracing the whole of the territory between the EU 
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and Turkey. This initiative becomes urgent since with the 
EU’s enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania, and with the 
opening of negotiations with Turkey and Croatia, the states 
of the Western Balkans will be hit by an increasing 
comparative disadvantage. Mobile businesses will be 
looking more actively at investment opportunities in the 
new member states and new candidate states, and therefore 
less at the Western Balkans.  
Business lobbies in the Western Balkans may protest that 
they cannot withstand this competition. Their concerns can 
be assuaged to some degree by offering an asymmetric 
adjustment period, with the EU offering immediate tariff- 
and quota-free trade deals for the exports of the Western 
Balkans, whereas these states might have a transition 
period of 5 years to phase out their own tariffs towards the 
EU and introduce the EU’s common external tariff regime 
for imports from third countries.  
A technical advantage of the Customs Union regime will 
be the scrapping of the burdensome rules of origin 
requirements for exports to the EU that contain inputs 
imported from third countries. This would in turn greatly 
facilitate the growth of direct investment from the EU in 
the Western Balkans, especially for intra-industry trade 
integration, which has to be the future of the region’s 
prosperity. 
Those protesting that the competitive pressures would be 
excessive have to say whether they really want to accede 
to the EU or not, or to reflect on what the prospects will be 
for attracting investment in an ever-decreasing ghetto of 
excluded Western Balkan states. Of course these states 
would prefer to have the political status of full EU 
membership, but even if they did, they would hardly be 
able to determine the EU’s external trade policies, or 
escape the disciplines of the internal market. On the other 
hand early accession to the Customs Union would avoid 
the very serious hazard of losing every conceivable 
competitive advantage they may have over the new 
member states that surround them. They would also be 
gaining a fresh argument for sustained adjustment aid, 
rather than see their allocations under pressure for 
reduction. For Serbia in the middle of the Western 
Balkans, the choice would be between that of regaining a 
regional economic hub role versus becoming the centre of 
a black hole.  
2.  A South-East European Schengen  
With the EU’s recent enlargement, Hungary and Slovenia 
have already had to comply with the EU’s visa policies, 
which meant introducing visa requirements for Bosnia, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. With the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania, these countries too 
will have to do the same, and so on with Croatia as and 
when its negotiations with the EU advance.  
It is bad enough for decent law-abiding citizens of South-
East Europe to face the visa queue at EU embassies, but 
now there is the prospect of the Western Balkans being 
driven back into an inner ghetto space. This applies of 
course only to the law-abiding citizens, since criminals can 
walk or bribe their way across these frontiers with little 
difficulty. The introduction of visa requirements between 
South-East European states is a stimulus for corruption and 
criminality, since the borders are unenforceable, and the 
attempts to install them create incentives for illegal 
activity, including the trafficking of goods and people. 
To avoid creating this ghetto hazard, the EU itself needs to 
reshape its Schengen doctrine, which presently requires the 
new member states to become Schengen-compliant with 
visa requirements before they have themselves full 
acceded to the Schengen system (i.e. with suppression of 
frontier checks). Thus, for example, frontier checks still 
take place on the Slovenian and Hungarian frontiers with 
Austria. 
The reshaping of present Schengen policy could be very 
simple in essence: all of South-East Europe could for the 
time being become a visa-free zone, including the new 
member states. The hard Schengen frontier, as at the 
Slovenian or Hungarian frontier with Austria, would 
remain for the time being. However the EU would cease to 
require the new member states or new candidate states 
such as Croatia to adopt the Schengen visa list for other 
Western Balkan states. This interim policy could last for a 
period of years while the Western Balkan states worked on 
their qualifications to gain visa-free status for the EU as a 
whole. The new member states would still retain frontier 
checks at their borders with the non-member Western 
Balkan states, and passports would be checked against 
computerised black lists of criminals and wanted persons 
with the aid of the Schengen Information System. 
Conclusions 
It is thus proposed that the European Commission and the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe should join 
together without delay to prepare plans for: 
1)  Enlargement of the Customs Union of the EU and 
Turkey to include the whole of the South-East 
European space in between. 
2)  A South-East European Schengen Agreement to cover 
the whole of the region including Turkey, permitting 
visa-free travel through all states of the region, 
whether EU member states or non-member states. 
These two initiatives, on top of the recent decisions to 
open accession or SAA negotiations with much of the 
region and the ongoing developments in regional energy 
and transport network initiatives, could be the core 
economic components of a new interim plan for the region 
– sufficient for several years to mobilise political energies 
and business interests.  
In the meantime outstanding constitutional issues would be 
worked upon and resolved: independence or not for 
Montenegro, final status for Kosovo and phasing out of the 
protectorate in Bosnia.  
 AN INTERIM PLAN FOR SOUTH-EAST EUROPE | 3 
 
Annex A. Matrix of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements 
 
 
 
 
  Free Trade Agreements in SEE as of 9 June 2005 
   Albania Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Bulgaria Croatia  Macedonia Moldova*  Romania  Serbia  & 
Montenegro** 
UNMIK/ Kosovo*** 
Albania     Applied 01/12/04 
WTO  
Applied 
01/09/03 
WTO  
Applied 
01/06/03 WTO 
Applied 
15/07/02 WTO  
Applied 
01/11/04 
WTO  
Applied 01/01/04 
WTO 
Applied 01/08/04 
WTO  
Applied 01/10/03 WTO  
Bosnia- 
Herzegovina 
Applied 
01/12/04 
WTO  
   Applied 
01/12/04 
WTO  
Applied 
01/01/05 WTO  
Applied 
01/07/02 WTO  
Applied 
01/05/04 
WTO  
 Applied 01/12/04 
WTO  
Applied 01/06/02   II round FTA negotiations 
Q2/05 
Bulgaria  Applied 
01/09/03 
WTO  
Applied 01/12/04 
WTO  
   CEFTA 
01/03/03 WTO  
Applied 
01/01/00 WTO  
Applied 
01/11/04 
WTO  
CEFTA 01/07/97 
WTO  
Applied 1/06/2004 
WTO  
Under examination 
Croatia  Applied 
01/06/03 
WTO  
Applied 01/01/05 
WTO 
CEFTA 
1/03/2003 
WTO  
   Applied 
11/06/97 
Revised 
11/06/02 
Applied 
11/07/02 WTO  
Applied 
01/10/04 
WTO  
CEFTA 01/03/03 
WTO  
Applied 01/07/04     
Macedonia  Applied 
15/07/02 
WTO  
Applied 01/07/02 
WTO  
Applied 
01/01/00 
WTO  
Applied 
11/06/97 
Revised 
11/06/02 
Applied 
11/07/02 WTO  
   Applied 
01/01/05 
WTO  
Applied 01/01/04 
WTO  
Initialised 31/05/05  IV round FTA negotiations 
08/06/05 
Moldova*  Applied 
01/11/04 
WTO  
Applied 01/05/04 
WTO  
Applied 
01/11/04 
WTO  
Applied 
01/10/04 WTO 
Applied 
01/01/05 WTO  
   Applied 17/11/94 
WTO 
Applied 01/09/04 
WTO  
  
Romania  Applied 
01/01/04 
WTO  
Applied 01/12/04 
WTO  
CEFTA 
01/07/97 
WTO  
CEFTA 
01/03/2003 
WTO  
Applied 
01/01/04 WTO  
Applied 
17/11/1994 
WTO  
   Applied 01/07/04 
WTO  
Under preliminary analysis 
Serbia & 
Montenegro** 
Applied 
01/08/04 
WTO  
Applied 01/06/02   Applied 
01/06/2004 
WTO  
Applied 
01/07/04  
Initialised 
31/05/05 
Applied 
01/09/04 
WTO  
 Applied 01/07/04 
WTO  
     
UNMIK/ 
Kosovo*** 
Applied 
01/10/03 
WTO  
II round FTA 
negotiations 
UNMIK/Kosovo 
Q2/05 
Under 
examination  
   IV round FTA 
negotiations 
08/06/05 
   Under preliminary 
analysis 
     
* Moldova is associated to the process with an extended timeline. 
** Serbia & Montenegro started negotiation process when it was known as FR Yugoslavia; therefore, both names may appear on the agreements. 
*** All agreements in line with UNSCR 1244. C  E 
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About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
    Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South-East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 